The Redcoat's Brown Bess
By George C. Neumann
By George C. Neumann
Another development of the earlier period
that was universally adopted by the middle of the century was the use of paper
cartridges for the smoothbore musket. The powder, ball and wadding were
included in a single package. By 1738 every nation had issued their infantry
with cartridges. This not only increased the speed of reloading and the rate of
fire, but also allowed the infantryman to carry more ammunition into battle.
Most soldiers in this period carried 60 rounds into battle.
Another important technological innovation
in this period was the introduction of the iron ramrod by Leopold of
Anhalt-Dessau in 1718. Up until this point, ramrods had been made of wood.
While serviceable, the wooden variety of ramrod suffered from some serious
faults, especially their tendency to break in the heat of battle. Although the
iron ramrod was ultimately a substantial improvement over its wooden cousin, it
too was not without its initial difficulties. The main problem was finding the
proper composition for the metal used. If the metal were too soft, the ramrod
might bend and become difficult to insert and remove from the barrel. On the
other hand if the ramrod were made too hard, it might become brittle and
subject to snapping just like a wooden one. But once the proper temper was
found the iron ramrod allowed musketeers to fire much more quickly. Moreover,
states during this period became centralized enough to create standardized
muskets and ammunition. The most famous example was the English 'Brown Bess'
.By 1730 the barrel was set at 1067 mm (42 inches) with a calibre of .75 (19
mm) and was provided with ammunition of .71 (18 mm) calibre. The smaller
diameter for ammunition meant that there was a degree of 'windage' as the ball
moved along the barrel when fired, reducing the accuracy. This was considered
to be more than compensated for by the ease with which the ball could be put
down the barrel and hence the additional speed with which the weapon could be
loaded. The Brown Bess was so successful that it continued to be manufactured
for more than 125 years, by which time some 7,800,000 had been made.
The new firing methods and technological
advancements in firearms allowed well-trained musketeers to fire as many as
five rounds per minute. This was, however, in the perfect conditions of the
parade field. In battle, things could turn out quite differently, often
reducing the rate of fire by more than half. Various factors contributed to the
reduction in the rate of fire. First, solders carried many more accoutrements into
battle, such as their knapsacks, canteens and so on, than were present during
drill. Second, the complex nature of the platoon firing systems tended to break
down in the smoke and din of the eighteenth-century battlefield. Both noise and
smoke made it difficult to hear the commands used in platoon firing systems.
This left soldiers to their own devices and so they continued to fire as
individuals. In the confusion of battle soldiers might even give up the use ,of
the ramrod, instead pouring the contents of the cartridge down the barrel, and
then banging the butt of the musket on the ground to complete the loading
process. This individual fire was common enough that by 1756 the French drill
manual included independent fire alongside platoon fire and fire by ranks as an
acceptable firing method.
Leopold, the old Dessauer, was also
responsible for another innovation of drill that had grander tactical
implications. Some time in the 1730s Leopold introduced cadenced marching in
Prussian units. With the introduction of marching in cadence, Prussian troops
advanced in unison, with each soldier marching in time with his comrades.
Troops kept in time with the beat of the drum. This type of marching could only
be used by troops who were very well disciplined and of all the armies in
Europe, the Prussian was most renowned for its high standards of discipline.
This discipline, however, was maintained by harsh corporal punishments.
The use of cadenced marching allowed the
Prussians to increase significantly their ability to manoeuvre both to the
field of battle and across it. For example, armies that did not use cadenced
marching used an open column as their basic formation for advancing to the
battlefield. The formation was called an open column since the intervals
between the files were quite large, sometimes as much as three metres (ten
feet) between them. This was necessary to avoid the unit from losing cohesion,
because the troops advanced without a regulated pace. This meant that as open
columns advanced on to the battlefield, the evolution of the battalion into
line was a cumbersome process as the companies of the column had to not only
form line, but also had to close their ranks and files.
The Prussians, using the cadenced system of
marching, could form more, closely-packed columns and use a variety of
different manoeuvres to form line more quickly and more efficiently. Another
advantage of cadenced marching was the speed with which it allowed lines to
move across the battlefield. Those armies that did not march in cadenced step
had to halt frequently to dress their ranks, with officers and NCOs moving
along the front and rear of the unit pushing men back into their proper
positions. A Prussian battalion in a line that advanced by cadenced marching
could keep its men closer together, often with elbows touching, and kept its
linear formation better, which in turn meant fewer halts to dress the ranks.
The Prussian army forged by the Old
Dessauer and bequeathed to Frederick the Great was an impressive institution.
It was highly disciplined, well equipped, capable of delivering tremendous
volumes of firepower against its foes and was highly manoeuvrable on the
battlefield. Despite the ... emphasis placed on firepower by Leopold of
Anhalt-Dessau, who actually argued that the firepower of the Prussian infantry
would allow them to be deployed in two ranks rather than three or four,
Frederick the Great initially chose to use the infantry's manoeuvrability and
discipline to bring his battalions into hand-to-hand combat with the enemy.
This followed current trends in military thinking, which emphasized the virtues
of the bayonet and close combat. But it soon became clear that with improved
weapons and firing systems, to march into contact with the enemy without the
use of one's own musketry was not prudent. Frederick later allowed his troops
to deliver volleys at close range before resorting to the push of the bayonet.
By the time of the Battle of Leuthen (December, 1757), Prussian troops relied
so heavily on firepower that units .required replenishment of their ammunition,
having expended the 60 rounds they carried into battle.
By the end of the Seven Years' War it was
clear that the Prussian army was the epitome of what could be achieved with the
weapons and formations of the age of linear warfare. It was also clear that
Frederick the Great was perhaps the practitioner who best understood the possibilities
and limits of warfare at the time.
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