Japanese Invasions of Korea and Gunpowder Weapons

Korean and Chinese soldiers assault the Japanese-built fortress at Ulsan.

The Siege of Pyongyang probably saw the largest use of artillery in the 16th century, as the Chinese had amassed an arsenal of 200 pieces of various types of artillery, including rocket arrows, breech-loading cannon and several large caliber "Great General" cannons (Although Song Yingchang's letter claimed that the Great Generals did not reach Pyongyang in time as they had intended). Both armies used state of the art firearms and cannons.


Although guns were widely available in the struggle for supremacy in China during the mid-fourteenth century, they became a cornerstone of the Ming army only after the Ming conquest of China. Before the end of the fourteenth century, almost 10 percent of the army’s 1.2–1.8 million soldiers were armed with guns. The capital’s arsenals produced 3,000 cannon and 3,000 handguns annually from 1380 to 1488. These weapons were widely deployed and initially gave Ming armies an advantage over neighboring states that were not so armed. European advances in gun technology were quickly adopted in China, and the cannon it brought into the field owed as much to the West as did the Japanese army’s muskets.
 
Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea brought about a direct clash between three different gun-armed forces, the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. Japanese forces were armed with muskets and trained in volley fire; Chinese forces relied upon cannon; and Korean forces used cannon on armored warships to interdict Japanese maritime supply lines. On the strategic level, the Japanese were completely defeated, achieving none of their political or military goals at a tremendous loss of life. Tactically, the results were more mixed. Chinese armies succeeded when they brought their cannon up to the battlefield, and lost when they did not. The Korean navy defeated the Japanese navy using cannon to oppose their boarding tactics, but was ineffective when poorly commanded. Overall, the conflict demonstrated that guns, whether muskets or cannon, were now critical in East Asian warfare.

After the first Japanese campaign (1592–3) was driven back to the southern tip of Korea, the Ming attempted to improve the Korean army by training its soldiers to use firearms. The course of the war surprised all sides, revealing deep-seated weaknesses within everyone’s armed forces. By campaigning outside of Japan, Hideyoshi subjected the Japanese army to new military problems that it struggled to overcome. The Korean and Chinese forces suffered similar difficulties in dealing with new modes of warfare. For example, the Ming army, which possessed several different kinds of troops based upon their regional origins, had to bring southern Chinese troops, who had previously fought against ‘‘Japanese’’ pirates, to the battlefield in order to engage the Japanese in close combat. Northern Chinese troops, who emphasized cavalry and had no experience of the Japanese, were generally regarded as ineffective.

It is impossible to draw conclusions about which mode of warfare was superior without taking into account the specific conditions and commanders of a given battle. Japanese superiority in close combat, and in medium-range missile firing through their use of muskets, was negated when Chinese cannon were present on the battlefield. At the same time, the test of combat could be rendered moot by larger strategic issues. Japanese attempts to hold and control Korean territory, combined with a desire to avoid large-scale battles with the Chinese and their cannons, induced them to disperse their troops and focus on ambushes and placing small garrisons in key locations. These tactics then exposed them to even greater risk, as Korean partisans were able to ambush small Japanese units, or harass their supply lines.

Hideyoshi’s invasions, like the construction of the Great Wall, demonstrated once again the close connection between siege warfare, naval warfare, and guns. While troops in the field could maneuver to take advantage of their own strengths and avoid those of their opponents, sometimes to the extent of refusing battle entirely, siege and naval warfare quite often did not allow that possibility. Strong points had to be taken if territory was to be controlled, certain sailing routes had to be used at certain times if ships were to reach their destination. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Japanese war effort was the Japanese navy, a rather surprising circumstance given the competence of Japanese sea lords earlier in the sixteenth century.

New Model Army: The Artillery and Staff

New Model Army: The Artillery

There was no set organization for the artillery, but for major field actions the New Model usually had a strong artillery train. Initially of 56 pieces of various calibres, the artillery doubtless grew in size as captured equipment was absorbed. Two companies of what were termed 'firelocks' accompanied the artillery. These were infantry armed with flintlock muskets, whose role was the protection of the gunners, the artillery train, the powder store and the wagon park generally. The issue of the latest type of hand-held firearm to these troops was essentially a safety measure. Their duty required them to be in constant proximity to the artillery train where, more than anywhere else in the army, there tended to be loose powder exposed in open barrels, or split in the heat of an action. The presence of musketeers with ever-burning slow matches would have been unacceptably hazardous; the chronicles of the Civil Wars offer us many examples of tragic accidents of this type. Major Desborough was the officer in command of the 'firelocks' at the formation of the New Model, and his men seem to have numbered around 120 or 130.

A company of pioneers was attached to the main artillery train; these worthies seem to have enjoyed semi-civilian status-certainly no uniform details are recorded. Their function seems to have been to assist in the passage of the artillery train along what passed for roads in 17th century England.

New Model Army: The Staff

The 17th century English army had a surprisingly large and organized staff. Serving directly under the commander-in-chief (in the New Model in 1645, Sir Thomas Fairfax, the Lord General of Parliament's forces) was the Lieutenant-General of the Horse-a post initially filled in the New Model by Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658). This officer ranked as second-in-command of the entire army and commander of all the cavalry of that army. Below him was the Commissary-General of the Horse, the second-in-command of the cavalry. Below the Commissary-General were two Adjutant- Generals of Horse; a Quarter-Master General of Horse; and a Muster-Master-General of Horse (this officer, at the outset one William Stone, had two deputies, and was responsible to the Treasury for the army rolls). The cavalry staff was completed by a Markmaster-General of Horse and a Commissary-General of Provisions.

The Sergeant-Major-General of the ·Foot had command of all the infantry in the army, and was the third-ranking officer in the overall hierarchy. To assist him he had a Quarter-Master-General of Foot and an Adjutant-General of Foot. The fourth-ranking officer in the army was the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, who controlled the artillery and engineers. Attached to the headquarters establishment was a Judge Advocate, with two Provost-Marshal-Generals, one of foot and the other of horse. A Commissary General of Victuals was responsible for the difficult task of keeping the army fed while on campaign.

New Model Army: The Horse and Dragoons

Pike & Shotte Dragoons

New Model Army: The Dragoons

The New Model initially had only one regiment of dragoons, commanded by Colonel John Okey. This was 1,000 strong, with ten equally-sized troops of 100 men. The dragoon was a hybrid soldier, a cross between infantryman and trooper, and the company organization in Okey's regiment reflected this. Each company had a captain, a lieutenant, a cornet and a quartermaster-cavalry ranks; but each company also had two drummers for signalling, as in infantry units.

Initially Okey's regiment followed the true dragoon or mounted infantry practice, i.e. they arrived on the field of battle on horseback but dismounted to fight. However, it would appear that they began to function more and more as regular cavalry, and in 1650 they were officially converted into a regiment of horse (receiving thereby substantial pay rises!). The strength and number of companies in a dragoon regiment varied considerably, depending on the task to hand. Morgan's Regiment, for example, raised for service in Scotland in 1651, had in October of that year eight troops-but in January 1653 we find only four troops each of only 60 men. Dragoon units were fairly easily raised, for most counties had companies of militia dragoons. They were particularly useful units for 'police' duties; and it is rare to find all ten companies of Okey's Regiment serving together after the Naseby campaign.

New Model Army: The Horse

The basic unit of cavalry was the troop, averaging some 60 troopers but rising occasionally to as many as 80. Generally there were six troops in a regiment, but instances of eight were not uncommon. Cromwell's own regiment of horse, dubbed 'The Ironsides', was a double-strength regiment of 14 troops, and upon the formation of the New Model provided enough men for the entire regiments of Fairfax and Whalley, with a cadre left over to form a basis for other units. Once the New Model cavalry became organized the regimental strength settled down at six troops of 100 men each.

The colonel and the sergeant-major each commanded a troop, the remaining four being led by captains. Troop officers were a lieutenant, a cornet and a quarter-master. The colonel's troop was frequently led by the senior lieutenant of the regiment since, as in the infantry, the colonel was often a general officer, absent on other duties.

The cavalry are one instance in the New Model of strengths being up to establishment, and sometimes even over the required figure. In the force Cromwell led to Ireland in July 1649 he had an overstrength regiment of horse of 14 troops under his personal command. This was subsequently split in two, and Cromwell's major, Thomas Shelloourne, was given command of the second regiment.

New Model Army: The Foot

On its formation in 1645 the regiments of the New Model were organized on the basis of the existing units from which they originated. There were gradual changes due to alterations to establishment, reflecting a constant lack of manpower. Initially a regiment of New Model infantry would have 1,200 men at full establishment. These were organized in ten unequally sized companies: the colonel's company had 200 men, the lieutenant-colonel's 160, the sergeant-major's 140, and each of the seven captains' companies 100 men. It was rare to see a regiment at full strength, however; 700 was considered a very strong establishment, and 300 to 500 was typical. It was normal for this to be reflected in a reduction in the number of captains' companies, rather than an even reduction in company strength throughout the unit.

The companies were each made up of two-thirds musketeers and one-third pikemen. The company would muster in a six-deep formation, with two bodies of musketeers flanking the pikemen. A further sub-division existed in the file of six men, led by a file leader; the file leaders made up the front rank of the company, and were, presumably, steady and reliable soldiers.

The officers generally comprised a captain in command, a lieutenant as second-in-command, and an ensign who carried the company colour. There were generally three or four sergeants, responsible both for the overall appearance of the company on the march or in the line of battle, and for supplies of match, powder and so forth. Other grades appear to have been present in varying numbers. There was, for example, no fixed ratio of corporals to numbers of men, as they seem to have been appointed at regimental level to suit company needs. Their role was not so much disciplinary-as was the case with sergeants-but more as instructors. It was the corporal who demonstrated to the newly joined recruit the drill with pike and musket.

Also on the strength were two drummers per company, who played an important role. All manoeuvring on the field of battle or on the march was controlled by drums, which had eight basic calls. The 'call' passed the order to muster on the company colour, and the ‘troop' signalled a ready position. 'Preparative' was the signal to close ranks and adopt fighting stance, and was followed by the 'battle' or 'charge', depending on the circumstances. If things went badly the 'retreat' signalled withdrawal; and the 'march' meant just that. 'Revalley' and 'tattoo' were peaceful camp signals.

The well-organized company was purely an administrative unit however; on the battlefield the regiment would deploy in three bodies, each a larger-size copy of the company deployment, with wings of musketeers flanking a central body of pikes. At both company and regimental level these bodies of men were termed 'divisions', which seem to have had a fairly loose definition. Assuming full regimental strength deployed for battle in three bodies in a six-deep formation, regimental frontage would be something in the region of 250 yards, although this figure probably varied considerably with the irregular establishments mentioned above.

The whole regiment would be commanded by the lieutenant-colonel: the colonel himself was generally a titular commander only, and was usually a general officer anyway.

The pike was considered a more honourable weapon than the musket, and the regimental colours-one per company-were carried in their ranks when in battle.

Gradually the discrepancy between company strengths seems to have disappeared, but in the mid-I650s the New Model regiments were still formed of uneven companies. Those of the colonel, lieutenant-colonel and sergeant-major had 145 men each, and the remaining seven companies 109 men each, giving an overall theoretical strength of 1,198, plus officers. The term 'officer' is one which was rather loosely applied in the mid-17th century, covering a colonel, a sergeant and even a drummer: in other words, any man who did not muster in the main body of regimental rank and file. Assuming this meaning, the total establishment would be 1,298, a figure rarely, if ever, achieved.

There are indications that by the time of the Restoration, New Model companies were of equal size and that the establishment norm had become 1,000 men.