French Napoleonic Artillery in Action

 

 General Dampierre (who was saved from the guillotine by being mortally wounded in 1793) said that the French soldier depended implicitly on the superiority of his artillery and that there was a noticeable lessening of his courage if he saw that artillery receive a check or draw back. Throughout the wars of the Republic the excellent French artillery made up for many deficiencies in the other arms. The new horse artillery made its first effective appearance of the Battle of Jemappes on 6th November 1792, when several batteries went into action. Although many of the men could as yet hardly ride, the batteries did so well that every general wanted them.

Marshal Saint-Cyr gives in his Mémoires an incident at the siege of Kehl in January 1797 which showed the tremendous pride in their arm possessed by men of the horse artillery. One of the siege batteries had been especially allotted to a company of horse artillery. But although the battery came under very heavy enfilade fire the men would not construct any earthworks to protect themselves from it. Their reply to instructions to do so was that they were horse artillery who fought in the open, and not behind entrenchments; and that if they were permitted to do so they would demolish the defences which had been erected against frontal fire. They had their way, and each morning by 9 o’clock their guns had been smashed and half their men killed or wounded.

The superiority of the French artillery was not due to its equipment, but to its tactical handling and to the efficiency and esprit de corps of its officers and men. That superiority was very marked, for instance, in the Jena-Auerstädt campaign of 1806. The Prussian army had a greater ratio of artillery to infantry than the French; but in the artillery, as in the other arms, the Prussian officers were still following the teachings of Frederick the Great. In their time these had been revolutionary, but that student of the art of war, Napoleon, had absorbed the lessons and had superimposed his own system of a massive artillery reserve, in order to achieve artillery superiority at the decisive point.

To take another example, the Russian artillery was excellent as regards its equipment, but it was poorly commanded. Sir Robert Wilson writes: ‘The Russian artillery is of the most powerful description. No other army moves with so many guns and with no other army is there a better state of equipment, or more gallantly served. The piece is well formed, and the carriage solid, without being heavy. The harness and the rope-tackling is of the best quality for service, and all the appurtenances of the gun complete and well arranged. The draught horses are small, but of great muscular strength, strongly loined, and with high blood. Four draw the light field pieces, and eight the twelve pounders; the latter have sometimes indeed ten horses.’ The extra horses were required for the dreadful Polish roads, before the frost stabilised the bottomless mud and after the thaw some months later. ‘The drivers,’ says Wilson, ‘are stout men: like all other drivers, they require superintendence in times of danger, to prevent their escape with the horses, but on various occasions they have also shown great courage and fidelity; and they have the essential merit of carefully providing subsistence for their horses. Neither gun, tumbril, nor cart belonging to the artillery is ever seen without forage of some kind, and generally collected by the prudence and diligence of the drivers.’ But the junior officers in the artillery were poor, and on active service an officer of cavalry or infantry was frequently appointed to the command of batteries.

‘The horse artillery’, says Wilson, ‘is no less well appointed, and the mounted detachments that accompany the guns ride excellent powerful horses.… The Cossaque artillery, worked by Cossaques, which is a late institution, consisted of 24 pieces, extremely light, and the carriages were fashioned with a care and nicety which did great credit to Russian workmanship.’

Earlier in this chapter there is mention of the division of artillery which Chef d’Escadrom Boulart was directed to raise for attachment to the Imperial Guard. This division went into action at Jena, and Boulart recounts his experiences as follows: ‘The Guard marched to Jena. It was a long day and we only arrived there as night was falling; but it was necessary to cross the town, including a street where a fire was raging both to right and left of the crossing. To pass this obstacle took much time and demanded many precautions; guns and wagons had to be sent over one by one, after unloading the forage, which as usual they were carrying. I was lucky that there was no unfortunate incident. I had been ordered, as soon as I had passed through Jena, to go into camp on a high plateau, which dominated the town and the valley of the Saale, where the Guard had taken up a position. But my leading vehicles had hardly entered the steep and sunken road which led to the plateau, when they were brought to a halt because the road was too narrow. My anxiety was great because I knew we would be fighting the next day and my horses, worn out from their long march, were in great need of food and rest. There was no time to lose. At the foot of the height, I parked as well as I could all my vehicles which had not yet entered the sunken road; then, equipping my gunners with all the pick-axes that I had, I got them to hew at the rock to widen the road. It was difficult and heavy work and progress was slow. I was striving desperately to quicken the pace, and was everywhere— animating, pressing, and encouraging my men. I was worn out with fatigue and anxiety; I felt that the Guard could not fight without me, or at least that I would be dishonoured if my artillery did not appear in time to take part in the action. At last, at daybreak, at the very moment when the Guard left their fires to stand to arms, my last vehicles arrived on the plateau and I began to breathe in the happy relief that I had achieved my aim. The first musket shots were soon heard and a little later the action became general. The din gradually moved further away, but the Guard took no part; it remained in order of battle during the whole action, only changing position to move forward as the leading lines gained ground, and containing its impatience whilst awaiting an order to move into the attack. In fact an order arrived at midday, but it only concerned my artillery. The Emperor sent instructions that it was to move forward immediately and that I was to ride ahead and get his orders. In an instant my batteries were on the way, and whilst they advanced at a trot, I galloped off to report their arrival to His Majesty. I found him just finishing an address to a large body of cavalry. This cavalry had just returned from the brilliant charges which had decided the victory, and the Emperor was expressing his satisfaction. It was a stirring moment. I approached to take his orders. “Well done!” he said to me, “I do not need your artillery; return to my Guard.”’

Shortly after the Battle of Jena, the artillery of the Guard arrived, and Boulart, with his artillery division, was transferred on attachment to Oudinot’s special infantry division, composed of grenadier and light infantry battalions.

But Boulart had made his mark and before the 1809 campaign he was posted to the Horse Artillery of the Guard as a Chef d’Escadron. He was soon promoted to Chef de Bataillon in a new regiment of Foot Artillery of the Guard, discarding rather reluctantly the blue dolman and pelisse of the Guard’s Horse Artillery.

When the French army entered Vienna in 1809, Boulart was commanding two batteries of the Foot Artillery of the Guard, equipped with a total of twelve pieces of ordnance. The Emperor inspected these two batteries at one of the daily parades at Schoenbrünn. As usual, he went into great detail, but found everything in order. One of the gunners, however, told the Emperor that one of the 12-pr. guns was ‘mad’—that is, its fire was a little uncertain.

At daybreak on 22nd May Boulart, who had his two batteries on the north side of the island of Lobau and close to the river, was ordered to send one of his batteries forward with the Chasseurs of the Guard. Leaving one battery close to the bridge, Boulart followed the chasseurs with the other towards Essling. He brought his battery into action but was soon overwhelmed by the Austrian fire, his battery commander losing an arm and he himself being slightly wounded. The position was untenable, and he moved the battery closer to the chasseurs, establishing it in a tile factory by the village of Gross-Aspern. But he had to contend with the fire of at least twelve pieces against his six. Short of ammunition, he sent back for more, but all the ground to his rear was swept by the heavy enemy fire. Finally, when half his men and a third of his horses were out of action, lack of ammunition forced him to cease fire and give way to a fresh battery.

Marshal Masséna was now 300 to 400 yards in rear with the Chasseur Division of the Guard, and Boulart reported to him and remained with him until the end of the action. Masséna told him that the Austrians had cut the bridge over the Danube and thus their communications. That night the army withdrew to the island of Lobau.

Boulart writes that, ‘On the 26th, as soon as the bridge was rebuilt, the Guard and my artillery crossed to the right bank, and moved to the village of Ebersdorf where Imperial Headquarters was. I had hardly been there an hour when the Emperor sent for me. I was taken into his office where he was standing by a table on which maps were spread out. “Have you brought back all your artillery?” he asked me. “Yes, Sire.” “Have you any ammunition left?” “Some grape shot but no round shot.” “And why have you not spat that out at the enemy’s face?” “Sire, because I was not within range, and the position of my battery was subordinated to that of the troops to which I was attached. Marshal Masséna, who was there, could see that I was not able to do more.” “How many men and horses have you lost?” “Sire (I gave him the figures).” “And your mad piece, did it fire well?” What a memory to recall such a minor detail! Nothing escaped him. “Yes, Sire, its fire has been better for I gave it my personal attention.” “And your other pieces, are they in good condition?” “Sire, there is one of which the vent is greatly widened and which has need of a vent lining.” “And why, Sir, has this lining not already been fitted?” He added in a high and angry tone, “In what regiment have you served?” This outburst, absolutely undeserved, disconcerted me a little. “Sire, I arrived on the Isle of Lobau where I had no resources with which to carry out this repair. There is only the arsenal at Vienna that might be able to do it, and already I have made arrangements to send the piece there.” “Yes; expedite its departure; tomorrow I will inspect your artillery and you will show me the repaired piece.” “Sire, your orders will be carried out.” I knew the thing impossible, but it was no good saying so. The Emperor knew nothing of impossibilities.

‘I was very worried when I left him, but I set about taking action immediately. I sent Captain Lefrancais to Vienna with the piece, telling him to expedite the repair if he could find at the arsenal a machine to install vent linings. But Captain Lefrancais would not be able to return in time for the Emperor’s inspection; and it was necessary, therefore, to procure a gun to replace temporarily the missing one. It seemed to me that it should suffice if the Emperor could see that my batteries were complete and ready to move. I hurried to see General Songis, to tell him of my trouble and seek his help. “I would willingly do so,” he said, “but in fact there are only Austrian 12-pr. guns in the general park, though these are of the same calibre as ours. If you wish I will put one at your disposal.” For lack of anything better I accepted; but the thought of the inspection the next day depressed me. The Emperor would of course notice the absence of my piece; and what would he say if he was still in his present bad humour? At least I would not fare any better, and at the worst I should get another “broadside”.

‘The next day at 11 am I went to His Majesty’s apartments; where I spent a long enough time in the antechamber with the Russian Colonel Czernischeff, a young and handsome man, beautifully turned out. At last I was summoned. He was not the same man as on the previous day; he had received excellent news of the Army of Italy and his face was cheerful and contented. I noticed this at once and was reassured. “Well, Commandant, your 12-pr., has it returned?” “Not yet, Sire. I am informed that I shall receive it during the day. Whilst waiting I have replaced it by a piece lent me by General Songis.” “Have you replenished your ammunition?” “Yes, Sire, I can now go into action.’ “Good. I will not inspect you.” And this was all said in a kindly tone with considerable charm.’

This account by Boulart tells us more about the personality of that remarkable man the Emperor Napoleon than do many books that have been written about him.

At the Battle of Wagram, which followed shortly after this incident, the French artillery fired 96,000 rounds. The day after the battle Boulart visited the ground which the Guard artillery had ploughed up with its projectiles and he did not find that the damage done was proportionate to the ammunition expended. Other parts of the field reinforced this impression. And yet never had such a mass of artillery been assembled, producing such a brisk, continuous and frightening noise; for those who heard the uproar from afar believed that the two armies were destroying themselves.

After Wagram, Boulart was promoted Major in the Guard, which gave him the rank of Colonel in the Line and the tide of ‘Colonel-Major’.

Japanese Invasions of Korea and Gunpowder Weapons

Korean and Chinese soldiers assault the Japanese-built fortress at Ulsan.

The Siege of Pyongyang probably saw the largest use of artillery in the 16th century, as the Chinese had amassed an arsenal of 200 pieces of various types of artillery, including rocket arrows, breech-loading cannon and several large caliber "Great General" cannons (Although Song Yingchang's letter claimed that the Great Generals did not reach Pyongyang in time as they had intended). Both armies used state of the art firearms and cannons.


Although guns were widely available in the struggle for supremacy in China during the mid-fourteenth century, they became a cornerstone of the Ming army only after the Ming conquest of China. Before the end of the fourteenth century, almost 10 percent of the army’s 1.2–1.8 million soldiers were armed with guns. The capital’s arsenals produced 3,000 cannon and 3,000 handguns annually from 1380 to 1488. These weapons were widely deployed and initially gave Ming armies an advantage over neighboring states that were not so armed. European advances in gun technology were quickly adopted in China, and the cannon it brought into the field owed as much to the West as did the Japanese army’s muskets.
 
Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea brought about a direct clash between three different gun-armed forces, the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. Japanese forces were armed with muskets and trained in volley fire; Chinese forces relied upon cannon; and Korean forces used cannon on armored warships to interdict Japanese maritime supply lines. On the strategic level, the Japanese were completely defeated, achieving none of their political or military goals at a tremendous loss of life. Tactically, the results were more mixed. Chinese armies succeeded when they brought their cannon up to the battlefield, and lost when they did not. The Korean navy defeated the Japanese navy using cannon to oppose their boarding tactics, but was ineffective when poorly commanded. Overall, the conflict demonstrated that guns, whether muskets or cannon, were now critical in East Asian warfare.

After the first Japanese campaign (1592–3) was driven back to the southern tip of Korea, the Ming attempted to improve the Korean army by training its soldiers to use firearms. The course of the war surprised all sides, revealing deep-seated weaknesses within everyone’s armed forces. By campaigning outside of Japan, Hideyoshi subjected the Japanese army to new military problems that it struggled to overcome. The Korean and Chinese forces suffered similar difficulties in dealing with new modes of warfare. For example, the Ming army, which possessed several different kinds of troops based upon their regional origins, had to bring southern Chinese troops, who had previously fought against ‘‘Japanese’’ pirates, to the battlefield in order to engage the Japanese in close combat. Northern Chinese troops, who emphasized cavalry and had no experience of the Japanese, were generally regarded as ineffective.

It is impossible to draw conclusions about which mode of warfare was superior without taking into account the specific conditions and commanders of a given battle. Japanese superiority in close combat, and in medium-range missile firing through their use of muskets, was negated when Chinese cannon were present on the battlefield. At the same time, the test of combat could be rendered moot by larger strategic issues. Japanese attempts to hold and control Korean territory, combined with a desire to avoid large-scale battles with the Chinese and their cannons, induced them to disperse their troops and focus on ambushes and placing small garrisons in key locations. These tactics then exposed them to even greater risk, as Korean partisans were able to ambush small Japanese units, or harass their supply lines.

Hideyoshi’s invasions, like the construction of the Great Wall, demonstrated once again the close connection between siege warfare, naval warfare, and guns. While troops in the field could maneuver to take advantage of their own strengths and avoid those of their opponents, sometimes to the extent of refusing battle entirely, siege and naval warfare quite often did not allow that possibility. Strong points had to be taken if territory was to be controlled, certain sailing routes had to be used at certain times if ships were to reach their destination. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Japanese war effort was the Japanese navy, a rather surprising circumstance given the competence of Japanese sea lords earlier in the sixteenth century.

British Infantry Firepower

 An incident in the rebellion of 1745, by David Morier

British participation in the War of the Austrian Succession was interrupted by the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 when Prince Charles Edward Stuart, with French support, landed in Scotland and raised a Scottish army to attempt to recover the Crown for his father. The eyewitness descriptions of combat that survive from that domestic affair allow a far more detailed analysis of how the British infantry fought than has so far been possible. From the beginning it was recognised that the threat posed by Highland forces was quite different from that of conventional European forces. Their tactics had been described by Lieutenant General Hugh Mackay who had been beaten by them at Killiekrankie.

Their way of fighting is to divide themselves by clans, the chief or principal man being at their heads, with some distance to distinguish betwixt them. They come on slowly till they be within distance of firing, which, because they keep no rank or file, doth ordinarily little harm. When their fire is over, they throw away their firelocks, and everyone drawing a long broad sword, with his targe (such as have them) on his left hand, they fall a running toward the enemy.

Lieutenant General Henry Hawley wrote a similar account of the Highlander’s tactics, adding that they normally formed four deep, with their best men in the front rank, but that by the time they reached their enemy they were twelve or fourteen deep. The Duke of Cumberland added further detail when he gave his orders on how the Highlanders were to be fought. His orders explained that the object of the Highlanders firing ‘at a distance’ was to draw their enemy’s fire, adding that after firing they lay down to avoid that return fire. This enabled them to charge home with swords against unloaded muskets.

Mackay’s attempts to overcome the Highland tactics ended in defeat. Hawley’s response was to advise firing by ranks, the fire directed at the centre of the attacking body of Highlanders, starting with the rear rank, but not firing until the range was ‘ten or twelve paces’. He deemed it necessary to wait until the range was so short because the speed of the advance would prevent reloading. Cumberland’s orders were more comprehensive as he allowed for the enemy advancing slowly as well as for the Highland charge. First he specified that a battalion must be in eighteen platoons. If the advance was slow he ordered that firing should be by half firings, that is three platoons at a time, in the case of a rapid advance the fire of the whole battalion was to be reserved until the range was ten or twelve yards. He makes no mention of firing by ranks, so it would seem the whole battalion was to fire together.

The first infantry to meet the Jacobite army were those of the scratch force of Lieutenant General Sir John Cope at Prestonpans on 21 September 1745. A considerable amount is known concerning events at Prestonpans because there was a subsequent inquiry into the defeat of Cope’s little army, although the main interest of the inquiry was the conduct of the senior officers, not the tactics employed. What is clear is that there was no attempt to fight the Jacobite army in anything other than a completely conventional way. The infantry was described as completely formed and having been divided into platoons and firings. When the Jacobites attacked first the dragoons broke and then the infantry gave what was described as ragged fire and also broke and ran.

At the battle of Falkirk, 17 January 1746, the British army was led by Lieutenant General Hawley and, following the defeat of his cavalry, most of his infantry turned and ran in the face of the Highland charge and a raging storm with rain and sleet. However, some detail is available of how the infantry battalions that did stand fought the Jacobites. In particular the description by a sergeant in Barrell’s regiment described how the front rank knelt while the centre and rear rank fired continually. This is confirmed by a private in Barrell’s who referred to the battalion keeping a reserve, that is the front rank. A description of the Royal Scots that appeared in a Dublin newspaper described them firing on attacking Highlanders, the rear rank first, then the centre rank and the front rank when the enemy were within a few paces. This was sufficient to repel the attack. There is a suggestion that while the front rank was held as a reserve, the centre and rear ranks fired by platoon rather than whole ranks, but on the whole those battalions that stood appear to have adhered to Hawley’s advice.


Prior to the battle of Culloden the Duke of Cumberland assembled his army at Aberdeen. There the infantry were carefully trained for the forthcoming confrontation with the Jacobite army and the Highland charge in particular. On 2 April 1746 Cumberland ordered: ‘The Royal North British Fuzileers to be out in the Park tomorrow at 11 o’clock there to practice the motions of alternate firings by platoons from ye right and left to ye centre reserving the fire of ye front rank & Grenadiers.’ These were followed by the Royal Scots, Price’s, Barrell’s and ‘Every Regiment to take their turns afterwards.’ This method of firing was a departure from the normal practice of firing by platoons organised into firings. In some ways this was similar to what Bland advised for dealing with cavalry, with the front rank reserved, but alternate firing was something that he advised against. He described the way the Dutch conducted alternate firing when advancing and although he thought it could be very effective against a stationary enemy he considered it to be vulnerable to a sudden counter-attack while the platoons were reloading. He emphasised that it was necessary for a battalion firing in this manner to advance slowly, ‘to give the Men Time to load their Arms before they approach too near the Enemy’. This would seem to make it unsuitable as a method of dealing with the fast-advancing Highlanders. However, the suggestion that a battalion could be left vulnerable while men reloaded also indicates that the whole fire of a battalion could be delivered very quickly in this manner, something that would be desirable against Highlanders closing quickly. Should that fire not stop an attack then the fire of the reserved grenadiers and front rank could be delivered at a range of only a few yards. This intention of delivering the maximum available fire in a short time at close range is borne out by a passage in a contemporary history of the rebellion that described the infantry at Culloden as firing ‘according to Orders, viz. the 2d and 3d Rank, as they were within 30 Yards, and the 1st, just as they were at the Muzzles of their Guns’.

In addition to a different form of firing the infantry also received instruction in a new way of using the bayonet. From its introduction the bayonet had been treated in the same manner as the pike and for combat it was held in exactly the same manner as the ‘charge for pike’ position. The soldier turned his body to the right with the musket held horizontally under the chin across the chest. The left hand supported the musket under the chin while the right arm was fully extended and the right hand held the musket butt. Drill for fighting with the bayonet was limited to simply thrusting the musket forward, bringing the right hand to the right shoulder and extending the left arm, all with the musket held horizontally at shoulder level. It would seem improbable that soldiers in hand-to-hand combat only plied their bayonets in this manner and it is possible that this lack of drill, when compared to the extensive instructions for musketry, might be partly responsible for the idea that firepower was more important than the bayonet. However, the amount of instruction required for an activity is not necessarily an indication of its relative importance.

Platoon Firing at Culloden: Front rank and Grenadiers held in reserve; second and third ranks of platoons firing in the sequence indicated from the flanks to the centre.

The drawback with this drill when fighting a Highlander armed with a sword in the right hand and a targe on the left arm was that any thrust with the bayonet was easily caught on the targe and the musket was also easily knocked aside by the targe, leaving the back of the soldier exposed to the sword. The solution to this problem was simple and introduced by the Duke of Cumberland: ‘his Highness took the pains to confer with every Battalion of Foot, on the proper Method of using the Musket and Bayonet to Advantage against the Sword and Target.’ He simply instructed the soldiers to reverse the position so that they faced to the left of their unit with the right hand under their chin and their left hand on the musket butt. The intention was that any thrust with the bayonet would then tend to come at a Highlander’s exposed right side instead of the left that was covered by the targe. Although Cumberland is usually credited with devising this drill, it is described in an article in the Gentleman’s Magazine for January 1746.

Cumberland’s army came face to face with the Jacobite army of Charles Edward Stuart on Culloden Moor on 16 April 1746. What followed was Cumberland’s army simply, efficiently and professionally going about its business, particularly the infantry. The Jacobite army was organised in two lines, the front consisting of the Highland units, with the Lowland units and French regulars in the second line. It was the Highlanders in the front line that attacked, moving forward in three large bodies. The body which moved towards Cumberland’s right flank did not make contact. Three times it advanced, trying to provoke the infantry into firing too soon, but, as Cumberland wrote in a letter to Lord Loudon: ‘On our right tho they came on with great fury, our Men did not take their firelocks from their shoulders tho they advanced three times within less than an hundred yards of us.’ It was also probable that the Jacobites were inhibited by the presence of three squadrons of cavalry on that flank.

On the other side of the battlefield the other two bodies of Highlanders coalesced into one single mass that struck the battalions of Barrell and Monro. Because of the surviving accounts and an accurate list of the strength of Cumberland’s army it is possible to examine in some detail the combat that ensued.

Barrell’s regiment took the brunt of the Highland charge. The strength of Barrell’s that day was 373, all ranks, of whom 325 were carrying muskets in the three-deep platoons. At this time infantry battalions consisted of nine hat companies and one grenadier company. Given the low strength of Barrell’s, it is probable that it was organised into a total of twelve platoons, giving a platoon strength of twenty-seven men. This would mean that the centre and rear ranks of the ten hat platoons contained 180 men and the reserve had 145 men. If they fired as related, the platoons would have commenced firing at thirty yards in what one eyewitness described as a ‘running fire’, followed by the reserve who ‘received them with their fire upon the Points of their Bayonets’. They appear to have only fired once before the Highlanders reached them, a total of 325 rounds.

Monro’s regiment was the largest battalion on the field with a total strength of 491 men and 426 men in the platoons. An account by a corporal in the regiment states: ‘we fired at about 50 yards Distance . . . they still advanced, and were almost upon us before we had loaden again. We immediately gave them another full fire.’ This probably means that the platoons of the centre and rear ranks fired twice, almost certainly tap-loading to get in a second round, followed by the reserve. Thus 236 men fired twice and 190 fired once, a total of 662 rounds. The corporal of Monro’s continued that ‘the Front Rank charged their Bayonets Breast high, and the Centre and Rear Ranks kept a continual Firing . . . most of us having discharged nine Shot each.’ Monro’s suffered a total of eighty-two killed and wounded in the battle, allowing for which the battalion could have fired approximately two thousand rounds at ranges well under fifty metres.
To the right of Monro’s was Cambell’s Royal Scots Fusiliers. Although not subsequently involved in hand-to-hand fighting, part of the Highland charge crossed its front. With 412 men in its platoons, and assuming its reserve did not fire, it is likely that it fired about 220 rounds at the Highlanders, if it only fired once. The initial fire received by the front of the Highland charge was probably in excess of one thousand rounds, many at point-blank range. The corporal of Monro’s wrote that this ‘made hundreds fall’.

It was at this point that Cumberland’s new bayonet drill came into play and numerous letters and accounts speak of its effectiveness. Cumberland himself wrote: ‘our Men fairly beat them & drove them back with their Bayonets & made a great slaughter of them.’ According to another account: ‘the Soldiers mutually defended each other, and pierced the Heart of his Opponent, ramming their fixed Bayonets up to the Socket.’ Another eyewitness claimed: ‘there being scarce one Soldier in Barreyl’s Regiment who did not each kill several Men; and they of Monro’s which ingaged did the same.’

Some Highlanders passed around the left flank of Barrell’s and between Barrell’s and Monro’s, overrunning two artillery pieces in the gap. Pairs of three-pounder cannon had been placed between the battalions in the front line and these undoubtedly added many casualties, the guns next to Barrell’s firing their last shots of grape at only six feet. The Highlanders who passed Barrell’s then came under fire from regiments in the second line. Subsequently these moved forward to support Barrell’s and Monro’s. In particular Edward Wolfe’s regiment marched to the left of Barrell’s and placed itself at right angles to the front line where it commenced firing. The account of an officer of that regiment says that the battalion fired five or six times. The strength of the regiment was 324 in the platoons and if this firing was carried out with the front rank and grenadier platoons reserved it would have fired between nine hundred and one thousand rounds into the Highlanders at close range. Ligonier’s, Bligh’s and Sempill’s regiments also added their weight to this fire with a total of 1,157 muskets in their platoons. There is no indication of how many rounds they fired, but if, like Wolfe’s, they fired five rounds each that would have been another 3,200 rounds.

All in all it would appear that the Highlanders received between six and seven thousand rounds from the battalions of British infantry, many at ranges well under fifty metres. The strength of the Highlanders who attacked the British left-flank battalions was about 2,500. According to the officer of Monro’s left-flank grenadier platoon: ‘we laid about 1,600 dead on the spot.’ The figures for rounds fired would seem to be reasonably robust, as the various sources are consistent. It would also seem that most, if not all, were fired at ranges under fifty metres and that a considerable proportion were fired at much closer ranges. The area where the greatest doubt is to be found is in the numbers of casualties actually inflicted by this fire. However, a return of approximately 1,600 casualties for six or seven thousand rounds is a hit rate of roughly 22–26 per cent, which is in keeping with the 23 per cent suggested for Fontenoy. Even if the casualty figure is high and includes casualties from other parts of the battlefield a figure of one thousand casualties still gives a rate of 14–16 per cent. It would be unwise to place too much reliance on these figures, but they do give an indication of the capability of British musketry to inflict high casualties at the short range that they seem to have preferred to engage at. Every soldier with a musket had twenty-four rounds at Culloden, yet Wolfe’s battalion fired only five or six rounds a man. It would seem most likely that they stopped firing because there was nothing left to fire at.

The Dutch Reforms

Prince Maurice at the Battle of Nieuwpoort by Pauwels van Hillegaert. Oil on canvas

LA BATALLA DE NIEUPORT 1600: Los Tecios in Flanders

In 1568 the Dutch began their long battle for independence from Spain and would remain at war intermittently for 80 years. The problems faced by the young Dutch republic played an important role in the military reforms that would take place there over several decades to come. Although many of these reforms centred on infantry organization, drill and tactics, the nature of warfare in the Netherlands would be one of many more sieges than battles.

The name most often associated with the Dutch reform movement is Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625). He was the son of William the Silent who had been one of the main leaders of the Dutch revolt. In 1684, at the age of only 17, he became Stadthalter of Holland and Zeeland. In 1590, he was made captain-general of all of the Dutch forces and was then in a position to undertake his reforms.

Like many of the military men of his age, Maurice hoped to emulate the military establishments of antiquity, in particular the Romans. Maurice read military manuals from antiquity, in particular those of Vegetius, Aelian, and the Taktika of the Byzantine emperor, Leo, as well as the works of contemporary commentators such as Justus Lipsius. What emerged for Maurice was an emphasis on regular standing forces and the importance of discipline and drill. But within the context of classical antiquity, Maurice also saw the importance of making more effective use of the constantly improving technology of gunpowder weapons.

One of the most important changes instituted by Maurice was the creation of a standing army. The army was still made up primarily of foreigners serving for pay. Some of these were mercenaries in the traditional sense, while others were foreign troops sent by their monarchs to serve under Dutch command and at Dutch expense (notably from England). In 1603, for example, the Dutch army consisted of a total of 132 companies. Of that number there were 43 English, 32 French, 20 Scottish, 11 Walloon, 9 German and a mere 17 Dutch. The main reason for the preponderance of foreigners was the relatively small population of the Netherlands, combined with the need to keep an army in the field almost constantly for 80 years. Maurice recognized that keeping these companies in his service all year round, rather than discharging them in the off-season or at the end of a campaign, would make the Dutch army a more effective fighting force in the long run.

The maintenance of this standing army also allowed Maurice to initiate new standards of discipline and drill. In this, Maurice was aided by his cousins William Louis and John, counts of Nassau. Maurice and his cousins oversaw the standardization of drill, and equipment, so that all the troops in Dutch service would be using the same methods regardless of their origin. The length of the pike and the armour of the pikemen, as well as the length and calibre of firearms were all standardized. Perhaps more important was the codification of drill at this time in the 'Dutch Discipline'. All words of command as well as the manual of arn1S for both the pike and arquebus and musket were regularized. In 1607 Jacob de Gheyn's Wapenhandelinghe was published - a complete manual of arms for pike, arquebus and musket illustrated with 116 plates, accompanied by the appropriate commands and a commentary.

Maurice also modified the military organization and tactics of the Dutch infantry. Once again Maurice turned to antiquity for inspiration. He hoped to replicate the flexibility of the Roman legion by creating units based upon the cohort to replace the large unwieldy regiments and tercios of his own time. To that end, he reorganized each Dutch regiment into two or more battalions. In theory, each battalion was to be 550 men, the same size as a cohort in Vegetius' antique legio, and was made up of 250 pikemen and 300 men armed with firearms, 60 of which were to form a line of skirmishers. The pikes were to form in the centre of the battalion with arquebusiers and musketeers on the wings.

Moreover, these units drew up in fewer ranks than the earlier regiments and tercios; figures vary but the pikes seem to have been between five and ten deep and the shot between eight and 12 ranks deep. The shot were trained to use countermarch fire, a tactic inspired by Aelian. In this formation the files of shot had intervals between them wide enough for a man to march.

The first soldiers in the file would fire a volley and then do an about face, marching back through the intervals and join the rear rank, all the while going through the drill to reload their weapons. This would be followed by the men of the second rank and then the third and so on. By the time men from the front rank returned to their original position, they would be reloaded and ready to fire another volley and start the drill all over again. This method of firing required great discipline but created a constant volume of fire from the unit. When threatened by cavalry, the arquebusiers and musketeers would retire behind 26 the pikes without disrupting the formation. In battle, the Dutch usually formed their battalions in three lines of battle. These lines could be staggered to resemble a chequerboard so that the battalions in the individual lines could support one another. This bears a striking resemblance to the Roman acies triplex of a legion drawn up in similar formation. Maurice laid the foundations for the early modern standing army based on constant drill and a high standard of discipline. He also developed a system of tactics that truly integrated pike and shot in a coherent fashion. Ironically, throughout the two decades of conflict with Spain, Maurice was only twice able to take his army into battle (both were victories), yet found himself participating in no fewer than 29 sieges.

The Burgundian Wars: A New Combined-Arms Synthesis versus Swiss Heavy Infantry

Swiss Cavalry: The largely Swiss Vorhut (Vanguard) of 7,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, were instructed to attack from the right, while the principal thrust would come from the 8,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry of the Gewalthut (Centre), which was dispatched on a difficult circuitous march round the left flank, over thickly wooded snow-covered slopes out of view of the waiting Burgundians. The small Nachhut (Rearguard) of 800 handgunners acted as a reserve.

Swiss Pikemen.

The reputation of the Swiss tactical system was further enhanced in campaigns against the duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold (r. 1465–1477). Charles had operated with impunity against the French crown following his defeat of King Louis XI of France (r. 1461–1483) at Monthlhéry in 1465. After Charles’s follow-on victories at Liège (1466) and Brustem (1467), he turned his attention to the Swiss on his eastern front. Here, the growing Swiss Confederation provided the military opposition to his plans. In order to weaken the Swiss, the duke of Burgundy planned to divide and conquer, cutting a path through the alpine alliance with the most modern army he could assemble.

To meet this objective, Charles fielded a well-financed combined-arms army of 30,000 men, consisting of Burgundian heavy cavalry, Flemish heavy infantry pikemen, Italian light infantry crossbowmen, German arquebusiers and mounted light infantry English longbowmen. Traditionally, Burgundian armies were small, with mercenaries making up at least 30 per cent of any force. But Charles’s grand ambitions required a larger fighting force, and beginning in the early 1470s, the duke strove to create permanent troops in mixed units (companies) of heavy cavalry, heavy infantry and light infantry archers, crossbowmen and handgunners, supported by the most modern artillery available.

Gunpowder technologies appeared on the battlefields of western Europe some time in the middle of the thirteenth century. Gunpowder was first utilized as a weapon by the Chinese prior to 1000 ce, where it was made into bombs and rockets. The likely conduit of diffusion from China was through Islamic lands to Byzantium or to Spain, then north of the Pyrenees to western Europe. References to gunpowder weaponry were included in armouries in Lille, Lucca, Aachen, London and Siena in the late 1330s and 1340s, and it appeared at the sieges of Tournai in 1340 and Calais in 1346–1347, and perhaps even at the battle of Crécy in 1346.

The first cannon made in Europe, in the early fourteenth century, were vase-shaped tubes which fired huge darts like those shot from the old Roman ballistae. Over time the darts gave way to round stone or metal projectiles and the barrels evolved into a straight tube. But over the next 150 years gunpowder weaponry underwent a spectacular evolutionary process as guns became less frequently forged and more frequently cast, increasing both reliability and durability. These improvements also allowed gunsmiths to make their weapons both much larger and much smaller, with the largest guns being capable of destroying medieval castle and city walls, and the smallest weapons eventually being handheld by a new breed of light infantryman, the medieval handgunner. Though poor construction and an elementary firing mechanism made early small arms an unreliable weapon system in the late medieval period, the light infantry handgunner would increasingly play a role on the battlefield next to archers and crossbowmen in the final wars of the period.

As gun barrels became longer and the art and science of casting iron improved, specialized siege artillery called bombards began to have a devastating effect on medieval fortifications. These early cannon were expensive to build and operate, and difficult to transport, and to be effective they needed to be just yards away from the target wall. Once in place, bombards fired stone shot weighing as much as 900 pounds, breaching walls and reducing towers almost at will. In 1409 the duke of Burgundy purchased two bombards that could hurl stones weighing between 700 and 900 pounds. The ‘Dulle Griet’ or ‘Great Bombard of Ghent’ was a forged iron cannon over 16 feet long with a 25 inch calibre. It could fire a stone shot weighing more than 750 pounds. These cumbersome weapons could be aimed in one of five ways – by placing a fixed mount on terrain at the desired angle; by mounting the cannon on a fixed axle to provide its aim; by using the terrain and axle together to aim the weapon; by using a rock or wall to adjust the aiming angle; and finally, by adding a calibrated aiming mechanism to the mount to change the angle of attack.

But changes in the fifteenth century improved the range and impact power of siege artillery. In the early 1400s a process called ‘corning’ began to be used when making gunpowder, mixing brandy, vinegar or even human urine into the black powder to form it into tiny pellets. Air flowed between the pellets allowing the powder to burn much faster and more evenly, greatly increasing the power of gunpowder weapons. By 1450 siege artillery further improved when stone shot was replaced by cast-iron balls, which had less ‘windage’ (space between projectile and the interior of the bore) and therefore attained greater muzzle velocity and impact energy. During this time, cannon were made in all different bore sizes, with little or no standardization until the late fifteenth century.

Initially, gunpowder weapons had more of an impact on sieges than they did on the battlefield. But with the adoption of smaller field artillery in the fifteenth century, medieval commanders had at their disposal another kind of missile platform to menace enemy formations. These guns began to appear more frequently on the battlefield, including many battles under survey here: at Agincourt in 1415, at Grandson and Murten in 1476, and at Nancy in 1477. But medieval field artillery still suffered from being too large and unwieldy to move easily on the battlefield, and therefore often became ineffective after the initial stages of the battle.

True field artillery did not make its sudden and dramatic appearance until the final decade of the fifteenth century, when the French invaded Italy. Here, these new guns, mounting new and lighter cast- bronze cannon on two-wheeled carriages pulled by horses, gave the French unprecedented tactical mobility against enemy formations and entrenched artillery positions. But France’s artillery supremacy on the battlefield was soon reversed by dramatic Spanish improvements in infantry small arms and tactics. As a result, field artillery declined in importance in the sixteenth century, except in the attack and defence of fortifications and in naval warfare.

To assist in the transition from a medieval to a modern army, Duke Charles published three detailed military instructions or ordinances every year from 1471 to 1473, standardizing the use of uniforms, armour and weapons for each man, and grouping them under conductors in companies with a designated hierarchy of numbered banners. By 1473 these Compagnies d’ordonnance numbered 900 men, based on a nine-man lance of heavy cavalry made up into four squadrons, with each squadron supported by 25 men-at-arms, 25 light horse, 25 valets and 75 mounted light infantry archers, further supported by contingents of 25 crossbowmen, 25 pikemen and 25 handgunners, all on foot. Unable to achieve these numbers with recruitment, Charles continued to employ foreign mercenaries.

After conquering Lorraine, Duke Charles marched into Alsace and took the surrender of the city of Grandson in February 1476. His execution of the garrison there solidified Swiss opposition, and on 2 March a relief army of 10,000 men arrived to block the Burgundian invasion. Recognizing he outnumbered the Swiss army three to one, Charles planned a defensive engagement, one that would capitalize on the confederation’s aggressive way of fighting. After launching two heavy cavalry charges into the unyielding Swiss ranks, the duke prepared for the inevitable, a Swiss heavy infantry counter-attack into his own centre. Employing a tactic similar to those used at Marathon and Cannae, Charles ordered his centre to pull back in the hopes of crushing the advancing Swiss squares in a double envelopment. But despite superior numbers, the Burgundian duke’s men lost their nerve and the planned retreat of the centre became a rout. Pressing forward with murderous efficiency, the Swiss mowed down the rear of the fleeing army, killing 300 invaders, and captured the Burgundian camp and over 400 artillery pieces. Swiss casualties were 200 men.

Despite the rout at Grandson, Charles quickly re-formed his army and resumed his invasion of confederate territory. It took several months to piece together his artillery train, but with this completed, Charles moved his army and on 9 June laid siege to the walled city of Murten, recently reinforced by a garrison of 500 Bernese men and, ironically, the majority of the captured Burgundian artillery. Over the next week, the captured artillery had a devastating effect on the Burgundian assaults, but on 17 June, Charles ordered his heavy bombards to be brought forward, and the besiegers successfully breached the southern walls. But even an eight-hour infantry assault against the damaged walls could not overwhelm the Swiss defenders, and on 19 June, Charles halted the attacks and turned his attention to the east, where a large Swiss army was expected to emerge in relief of Murten.

Charles the Bold ordered his troops to prepare for the defensive, and construct a ditch and palisade entrenchment known as the Grünhag, manned by light infantry and artillery. He intended to use his bowmen, handgunners and field artillery to create a killing field, then exploit the chaos with his flanking cavalry. But 21 June passed without the arrival of the Swiss, forcing Charles to stand down his army. Finally, on 22 June, a large Swiss relief force of 25,000 men exploded out of the woods and into the undermanned Burgundian defences. At the time of the Swiss arrival, only 2,000 light infantry manned the Burgundian centre, with 1,200 heavy cavalry in support. The rest of the duke of Burgundy’s troops were eating in the camp some distance away.

Advancing from the north-east through the Birchenwald forest, the Swiss army was concealed until it was only a mile away from the Burgundian lines. The Swiss attacked from a column of three battle squares, supported by a vanguard of 5,000 light infantry skirmishers, protected by a contingent of 1,200 heavy cavalry on the left. Behind the van, 12,000 Swiss heavy infantry made up the centre square, followed by another 7,000 heavy infantry in the rear. The three Swiss squares marched in echelon, with the centre and rear squares set back and to the left of the vanguard.

Behind the Grünhag, the Burgundian men-at-arms (including mercenary English longbowmen) were ready for the impending attack, and the first wave of the Swiss vanguard suffered heavy casualties from concentrated crossbow, longbow and light artillery fire. For a moment, the momentum of the initial Swiss assault was checked, but shrewd manoeuvring by part of the Swiss vanguard allowed the attackers to bypass the earthworks and turn the enemy’s flank. With the Grünhag in friendly hands, the centre and rear squares surged westwards to cut off any Burgundian retreat to the south.

Meanwhile on the Swiss left flank, the 1,200 allied heavy cavalry scattered the Burgundian horse, then galloped on to attack the now fleeing Burgundian centre. There was no escape route for Charles’s new model army, and the Swiss, pledging no quarter, took no prisoners. A timely sortie by the Swiss garrison in Murten aggravated the Burgundian situation, striking the broken army in the rear. In the ensuing massacre, the duke lost 12,000 men, cut down or drowned in nearby Lake Murten. Swiss casualties were light, only 410 men. The Burgundians also lost their artillery park, with the Swiss profiting by the acquisition of another 200 guns.

Charles the Bold’s third and final battle against the Swiss took place at Nancy in January 1477. Driven out of Switzerland in the autumn of 1476, the duke took up a strong defensive position behind a shallow stream south of the city of Nancy, the capital of Lorraine, once again blocking the likely angle of attack with his artillery. But his army was by now only around 12,000 men. The sudden appearance of the main Swiss force of 20,000 from the woods took the Burgundians by surprise, with the van circling to the left and attacking the Burgundian flank. In a co-ordinated strike, the Swiss fell on Charles’s troops, wielding their pikes and halberds. Attacked on two sides by overwhelming numbers, 7,000 Burgundians were killed, including Charles himself, his head split open by a halberd stroke. In less than a year, the Swiss defeated three Burgundian armies. The battle of Nancy ended the power of Burgundy forever, allowing Charles’s other nemesis, King Louis XI of France, to finally incorporate the duchy and its innovative military institutions into his kingdom.

Despite a relatively balanced combined-arms tactical system, the Burgundian duke’s new model army was unable to ‘match the discipline of the Swiss or cope with the élan of their assaults’. Charles’s failure stemmed from taking on the best heavy infantry in Europe. Swiss militia armies were large and quickly mustered, but they could not stay in the field for long. Charles’s aggressive strategy of seeking battle brought his armies into conflict with a motivated enemy fighting to protect its homeland. Nevertheless, his combination of horse, foot and artillery was to become a model for European armies for centuries to come.

After the death of Charles the Bold at Nancy in 1477, the Swiss acquired a reputation for invincibility that lasted until the battle of Marignano in 1515. They created a heavy infantry weapon system that could do more than passively resist cavalry charges or engage in sieges. Disciplined and relatively well articulated, the Swiss battle square was capable of offensive manoeuvre and all-round defence. And like English light infantry longbowmen, Swiss heavy infantry found themselves a wanted commodity on the battlefields of Europe, with Swiss mercenaries soon employed as mercenaries in armies all over the continent. Impressed with the success of the Swiss battle square in the wars against Burgundy, Louis XI added 6,000 Swiss mercenaries armed with halberd and pike to his own army in 1479, and in 1497 a cadre of 100 Swiss elite were officially organized as the French king’s personal bodyguard, the Garde des Cent Suisses. In Italy the Swiss hired themselves out to Italian mercenary commanders or condottieri (from the Italian term condotta, the contract negotiated between Italian city-states and military entrepreneurs). Moreover, this innovation in heavy infantry bred imitation, and other nations developed their own pikemen modelled on the Swiss. The Germans had the most success with their Landsknechts, who also fought abroad as mercenaries.

By the close of the medieval period, the Swiss method of fighting would be diffused to all of western Europe. Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), writing in the early 1520s, found that all infantry imitated the Swiss. By the middle of the sixteenth century, French, Spanish, German and Italian armies used what has been described as the Swiss way of warfare, even if they adopted the Swiss phalanx in modified form. Pikemen, increasingly supported by light infantry handgunners, remained a persistent tactical entity on European battlefields well into the early modern period.