Swiss Cavalry: The largely Swiss Vorhut (Vanguard) of 7,000 infantry
and 2,000 cavalry, were instructed to attack from the right, while the
principal thrust would come from the 8,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry of the
Gewalthut (Centre), which was dispatched on a difficult circuitous march round
the left flank, over thickly wooded snow-covered slopes out of view of the
waiting Burgundians. The small Nachhut (Rearguard) of 800 handgunners acted as
a reserve.
Swiss Pikemen.
The reputation of the Swiss tactical system was further
enhanced in campaigns against the duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold (r.
1465–1477). Charles had operated with impunity against the French crown
following his defeat of King Louis XI of France (r. 1461–1483) at Monthlhéry in
1465. After Charles’s follow-on victories at Liège (1466) and Brustem (1467),
he turned his attention to the Swiss on his eastern front. Here, the growing
Swiss Confederation provided the military opposition to his plans. In order to
weaken the Swiss, the duke of Burgundy planned to divide and conquer, cutting a
path through the alpine alliance with the most modern army he could assemble.
To meet this objective, Charles fielded a well-financed
combined-arms army of 30,000 men, consisting of Burgundian heavy cavalry,
Flemish heavy infantry pikemen, Italian light infantry crossbowmen, German
arquebusiers and mounted light infantry English longbowmen. Traditionally,
Burgundian armies were small, with mercenaries making up at least 30 per cent
of any force. But Charles’s grand ambitions required a larger fighting force,
and beginning in the early 1470s, the duke strove to create permanent troops in
mixed units (companies) of heavy cavalry, heavy infantry and light infantry
archers, crossbowmen and handgunners, supported by the most modern artillery
available.
Gunpowder technologies appeared on the battlefields of
western Europe some time in the middle of the thirteenth century. Gunpowder was
first utilized as a weapon by the Chinese prior to 1000 ce, where it was made
into bombs and rockets. The likely conduit of diffusion from China was through
Islamic lands to Byzantium or to Spain, then north of the Pyrenees to western
Europe. References to gunpowder weaponry were included in armouries in Lille,
Lucca, Aachen, London and Siena in the late 1330s and 1340s, and it appeared at
the sieges of Tournai in 1340 and Calais in 1346–1347, and perhaps even at the
battle of Crécy in 1346.
The first cannon made in Europe, in the early fourteenth
century, were vase-shaped tubes which fired huge darts like those shot from the
old Roman ballistae. Over time the darts gave way to round stone or metal
projectiles and the barrels evolved into a straight tube. But over the next 150
years gunpowder weaponry underwent a spectacular evolutionary process as guns
became less frequently forged and more frequently cast, increasing both
reliability and durability. These improvements also allowed gunsmiths to make
their weapons both much larger and much smaller, with the largest guns being
capable of destroying medieval castle and city walls, and the smallest weapons
eventually being handheld by a new breed of light infantryman, the medieval
handgunner. Though poor construction and an elementary firing mechanism made
early small arms an unreliable weapon system in the late medieval period, the
light infantry handgunner would increasingly play a role on the battlefield
next to archers and crossbowmen in the final wars of the period.
As gun barrels became longer and the art and science of
casting iron improved, specialized siege artillery called bombards began to
have a devastating effect on medieval fortifications. These early cannon were
expensive to build and operate, and difficult to transport, and to be effective
they needed to be just yards away from the target wall. Once in place, bombards
fired stone shot weighing as much as 900 pounds, breaching walls and reducing
towers almost at will. In 1409 the duke of Burgundy purchased two bombards that
could hurl stones weighing between 700 and 900 pounds. The ‘Dulle Griet’ or
‘Great Bombard of Ghent’ was a forged iron cannon over 16 feet long with a 25
inch calibre. It could fire a stone shot weighing more than 750 pounds. These
cumbersome weapons could be aimed in one of five ways – by placing a fixed
mount on terrain at the desired angle; by mounting the cannon on a fixed axle
to provide its aim; by using the terrain and axle together to aim the weapon;
by using a rock or wall to adjust the aiming angle; and finally, by adding a
calibrated aiming mechanism to the mount to change the angle of attack.
But changes in the fifteenth century improved the range and
impact power of siege artillery. In the early 1400s a process called ‘corning’
began to be used when making gunpowder, mixing brandy, vinegar or even human
urine into the black powder to form it into tiny pellets. Air flowed between
the pellets allowing the powder to burn much faster and more evenly, greatly
increasing the power of gunpowder weapons. By 1450 siege artillery further
improved when stone shot was replaced by cast-iron balls, which had less
‘windage’ (space between projectile and the interior of the bore) and therefore
attained greater muzzle velocity and impact energy. During this time, cannon
were made in all different bore sizes, with little or no standardization until
the late fifteenth century.
Initially, gunpowder weapons had more of an impact on sieges
than they did on the battlefield. But with the adoption of smaller field
artillery in the fifteenth century, medieval commanders had at their disposal
another kind of missile platform to menace enemy formations. These guns began
to appear more frequently on the battlefield, including many battles under
survey here: at Agincourt in 1415, at Grandson and Murten in 1476, and at Nancy
in 1477. But medieval field artillery still suffered from being too large and
unwieldy to move easily on the battlefield, and therefore often became
ineffective after the initial stages of the battle.
True field artillery did not make its sudden and dramatic
appearance until the final decade of the fifteenth century, when the French
invaded Italy. Here, these new guns, mounting new and lighter cast- bronze
cannon on two-wheeled carriages pulled by horses, gave the French unprecedented
tactical mobility against enemy formations and entrenched artillery positions.
But France’s artillery supremacy on the battlefield was soon reversed by
dramatic Spanish improvements in infantry small arms and tactics. As a result,
field artillery declined in importance in the sixteenth century, except in the
attack and defence of fortifications and in naval warfare.
To assist in the transition from a medieval to a modern
army, Duke Charles published three detailed military instructions or ordinances
every year from 1471 to 1473, standardizing the use of uniforms, armour and
weapons for each man, and grouping them under conductors in companies with a
designated hierarchy of numbered banners. By 1473 these Compagnies d’ordonnance
numbered 900 men, based on a nine-man lance of heavy cavalry made up into four
squadrons, with each squadron supported by 25 men-at-arms, 25 light horse, 25 valets
and 75 mounted light infantry archers, further supported by contingents of 25
crossbowmen, 25 pikemen and 25 handgunners, all on foot. Unable to achieve
these numbers with recruitment, Charles continued to employ foreign
mercenaries.
After conquering Lorraine, Duke Charles marched into Alsace
and took the surrender of the city of Grandson in February 1476. His execution
of the garrison there solidified Swiss opposition, and on 2 March a relief army
of 10,000 men arrived to block the Burgundian invasion. Recognizing he
outnumbered the Swiss army three to one, Charles planned a defensive
engagement, one that would capitalize on the confederation’s aggressive way of
fighting. After launching two heavy cavalry charges into the unyielding Swiss
ranks, the duke prepared for the inevitable, a Swiss heavy infantry
counter-attack into his own centre. Employing a tactic similar to those used at
Marathon and Cannae, Charles ordered his centre to pull back in the hopes of
crushing the advancing Swiss squares in a double envelopment. But despite
superior numbers, the Burgundian duke’s men lost their nerve and the planned
retreat of the centre became a rout. Pressing forward with murderous
efficiency, the Swiss mowed down the rear of the fleeing army, killing 300 invaders,
and captured the Burgundian camp and over 400 artillery pieces. Swiss
casualties were 200 men.
Despite the rout at Grandson, Charles quickly re-formed his
army and resumed his invasion of confederate territory. It took several months
to piece together his artillery train, but with this completed, Charles moved
his army and on 9 June laid siege to the walled city of Murten, recently
reinforced by a garrison of 500 Bernese men and, ironically, the majority of
the captured Burgundian artillery. Over the next week, the captured artillery
had a devastating effect on the Burgundian assaults, but on 17 June, Charles
ordered his heavy bombards to be brought forward, and the besiegers
successfully breached the southern walls. But even an eight-hour infantry assault
against the damaged walls could not overwhelm the Swiss defenders, and on 19
June, Charles halted the attacks and turned his attention to the east, where a
large Swiss army was expected to emerge in relief of Murten.
Charles the Bold ordered his troops to prepare for the
defensive, and construct a ditch and palisade entrenchment known as the
Grünhag, manned by light infantry and artillery. He intended to use his bowmen,
handgunners and field artillery to create a killing field, then exploit the
chaos with his flanking cavalry. But 21 June passed without the arrival of the
Swiss, forcing Charles to stand down his army. Finally, on 22 June, a large
Swiss relief force of 25,000 men exploded out of the woods and into the
undermanned Burgundian defences. At the time of the Swiss arrival, only 2,000
light infantry manned the Burgundian centre, with 1,200 heavy cavalry in
support. The rest of the duke of Burgundy’s troops were eating in the camp some
distance away.
Advancing from the north-east through the Birchenwald
forest, the Swiss army was concealed until it was only a mile away from the
Burgundian lines. The Swiss attacked from a column of three battle squares,
supported by a vanguard of 5,000 light infantry skirmishers, protected by a
contingent of 1,200 heavy cavalry on the left. Behind the van, 12,000 Swiss
heavy infantry made up the centre square, followed by another 7,000 heavy
infantry in the rear. The three Swiss squares marched in echelon, with the
centre and rear squares set back and to the left of the vanguard.
Behind the Grünhag, the Burgundian men-at-arms (including
mercenary English longbowmen) were ready for the impending attack, and the
first wave of the Swiss vanguard suffered heavy casualties from concentrated
crossbow, longbow and light artillery fire. For a moment, the momentum of the
initial Swiss assault was checked, but shrewd manoeuvring by part of the Swiss
vanguard allowed the attackers to bypass the earthworks and turn the enemy’s
flank. With the Grünhag in friendly hands, the centre and rear squares surged
westwards to cut off any Burgundian retreat to the south.
Meanwhile on the Swiss left flank, the 1,200 allied heavy
cavalry scattered the Burgundian horse, then galloped on to attack the now
fleeing Burgundian centre. There was no escape route for Charles’s new model
army, and the Swiss, pledging no quarter, took no prisoners. A timely sortie by
the Swiss garrison in Murten aggravated the Burgundian situation, striking the
broken army in the rear. In the ensuing massacre, the duke lost 12,000 men, cut
down or drowned in nearby Lake Murten. Swiss casualties were light, only 410
men. The Burgundians also lost their artillery park, with the Swiss profiting
by the acquisition of another 200 guns.
Charles the Bold’s third and final battle against the Swiss
took place at Nancy in January 1477. Driven out of Switzerland in the autumn of
1476, the duke took up a strong defensive position behind a shallow stream
south of the city of Nancy, the capital of Lorraine, once again blocking the likely
angle of attack with his artillery. But his army was by now only around 12,000
men. The sudden appearance of the main Swiss force of 20,000 from the woods
took the Burgundians by surprise, with the van circling to the left and
attacking the Burgundian flank. In a co-ordinated strike, the Swiss fell on
Charles’s troops, wielding their pikes and halberds. Attacked on two sides by
overwhelming numbers, 7,000 Burgundians were killed, including Charles himself,
his head split open by a halberd stroke. In less than a year, the Swiss
defeated three Burgundian armies. The battle of Nancy ended the power of
Burgundy forever, allowing Charles’s other nemesis, King Louis XI of France, to
finally incorporate the duchy and its innovative military institutions into his
kingdom.
Despite a relatively balanced combined-arms tactical system,
the Burgundian duke’s new model army was unable to ‘match the discipline of the
Swiss or cope with the élan of their assaults’. Charles’s failure stemmed from
taking on the best heavy infantry in Europe. Swiss militia armies were large
and quickly mustered, but they could not stay in the field for long. Charles’s
aggressive strategy of seeking battle brought his armies into conflict with a
motivated enemy fighting to protect its homeland. Nevertheless, his combination
of horse, foot and artillery was to become a model for European armies for
centuries to come.
After the death of Charles the Bold at Nancy in 1477, the
Swiss acquired a reputation for invincibility that lasted until the battle of
Marignano in 1515. They created a heavy infantry weapon system that could do
more than passively resist cavalry charges or engage in sieges. Disciplined and
relatively well articulated, the Swiss battle square was capable of offensive
manoeuvre and all-round defence. And like English light infantry longbowmen,
Swiss heavy infantry found themselves a wanted commodity on the battlefields of
Europe, with Swiss mercenaries soon employed as mercenaries in armies all over
the continent. Impressed with the success of the Swiss battle square in the
wars against Burgundy, Louis XI added 6,000 Swiss mercenaries armed with
halberd and pike to his own army in 1479, and in 1497 a cadre of 100 Swiss
elite were officially organized as the French king’s personal bodyguard, the
Garde des Cent Suisses. In Italy the Swiss hired themselves out to Italian
mercenary commanders or condottieri (from the Italian term condotta, the
contract negotiated between Italian city-states and military entrepreneurs).
Moreover, this innovation in heavy infantry bred imitation, and other nations
developed their own pikemen modelled on the Swiss. The Germans had the most success
with their Landsknechts, who also fought abroad as mercenaries.
By the close of the medieval period, the Swiss method of
fighting would be diffused to all of western Europe. Niccolò Machiavelli
(1469–1527), writing in the early 1520s, found that all infantry imitated the
Swiss. By the middle of the sixteenth century, French, Spanish, German and
Italian armies used what has been described as the Swiss way of warfare, even
if they adopted the Swiss phalanx in modified form. Pikemen, increasingly
supported by light infantry handgunners, remained a persistent tactical entity
on European battlefields well into the early modern period.
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